

**Comparison of the positions of voters and candidates on populism:
the Greek case**

Maria Tsigkou and Ioannis Andreadis

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) – General Conference

22-26 August 2022

Abstract

Populism has most often been examined from the supply-side of politics, as scholarship primarily focused on the rhetoric of populist movements, parties, and leaders. Most empirical research before the 2010s was based on qualitative approaches (e.g., Betz, 1994; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2007). Since then, an increasing number of studies take a more quantitative approach, as they delve into the study of both the supply- and demand-side of populism by using survey items to measure populist attitudes. Based on an ideational approach, that is, the belief that populism is a set of ideas, populism can be measured as an attitude that individuals can possess to a greater or a lesser extent (Rooduijn, 2018). This approach paves the way for examining populism, both at the demand and the supply side, with quantitative methods. Recent scholarship uses survey items to gauge levels of populism among individuals. These individual-level studies on populist attitudes form the foundation of the elite surveys on populism.

This paper intends to study and compare the positions of Greek voters and parliamentary candidates on a number of issues related to populism through quantitative research. Relying on the data of 2019 Greek national election studies (i.e., candidate and voter surveys) that were collected in the framework of the DATAPOPEU research project we aim to answer the following research question: do voters share the same views on issues related to populism as the candidates they vote for? However, as with any survey, some survey items may not work, so this paper's goal is also to identify the survey items of populism that work and those that do not. In this paper we use Greece as a case study; however, as many of the survey items used in these post-election studies have been used in surveys in other countries, this work contributes to the comparative research of populism and aims at encouraging

scholars from other countries to include more survey items related to populism in their future election studies.

Keywords: Populism; Candidates; Voters; Surveys; Quantitative methods

Introduction

In recent years, especially in the 21st century, many populist parties have emerged, and support for these parties has increased dramatically (Rooduijn, 2018). Although there are many different approaches and definitions of populism, all scholars agree that populists understand politics as a Manichean struggle between the will of the common people and an evil, conspiring elite (e.g., Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019).

Populism has most often been examined from the supply-side of politics, as scholarship primarily focused on the ideology and rhetoric of populist movements, parties, and leaders. Most empirical research before the 2010s was based on qualitative approaches (e.g., Betz, 1994; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2007). Since then, an increasing number of studies take a more quantitative approach, as they delve into the study of both the supply- and demand-side of populism by using survey items to measure populist attitudes.

Based on an ideational approach, that is, the belief that populism is a set of ideas, populism can be measured as an attitude that individuals can possess to a greater or a lesser extent (Rooduijn, 2018). These ideas are expressed in the rhetoric of populist leaders and supporters and have an impact on elected officials' behaviour and the resultant policies. Furthermore, these ideas are one of the main factors that motivate people to mobilize and support populists (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Hawkins et al., 2020). This approach paves the way for examining populism, both at the demand and the supply side, with quantitative methods. Therefore, in this paper we use as an ideological starting point the ideational approach to populism as it allows us to study both the demand- and the supply-side of populism with survey items.

Recent scholarship uses survey items to gauge levels of populism amongst individuals (Hawkins and Riding, 2010; Stanley, 2011; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012; Rooduijn, 2018; Akkerman et al., 2014; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel, 2018). The individual-level studies on populist attitudes form the foundation of the elite surveys on populist attitudes. Even though some of the more foundational studies of populism focus on the elites in a more conceptual and qualitative way (e.g., Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004), some recent scholarship takes a more quantitative approach to examine levels of populism amongst elites (Andreadis & Ruth-Lovell 2019; Stavrakakis et al. 2017; Andreadis & Stavrakakis 2017).

In this paper we will study and compare the positions of Greek voters and parliamentary candidates on a number of issues related to populism through quantitative research. As Rooduijn (2018) points out, to understand the political success of populists across Europe we must not only focus on the populist parties themselves but also on their voters/supporters and study their motivations. Therefore, relying on the data of 2019 Greek national election studies (i.e., candidate and voter

surveys) we aim to answer the following research question: do voters share the same views on issues related to populism as the candidates they vote for? Furthermore, as with any survey, some survey items may not work, so this paper's goal is also to identify the survey items of populism that work and those that do not.

The first section of the article lays out the concept of populism and the theory of populism with which we are concerned in this paper, the previous quantitative research on populist attitudes (i.e., voter surveys and candidate surveys) and the concept of congruence, namely the linkage between citizens and their representatives regarding their views on populism. The second section outlines our methods and data, while the third section offers our analysis of the data focusing on the survey items that seem to work in both candidate and voter study data, thus constructing a populist attitudes index and on the comparison between the positions of candidates and voters of each party on populism. Finally, the paper ends with conclusion and discussion regarding the further steps of this study.

Theoretical background

Conceptualizing Populism

Various theories have been developed from time to time to define populism, however, as they are very different both in terms of content as well as the time of their appearance, the definitions of populism are quite different from each other, with populism being a movement, a political style, a discourse, a political strategy, an ideology, a set of ideas.

The concept of populism has taken on both positive and negative connotations. For example, in America (both the US and the rest of America) a positive view of populism has prevailed as it is considered a "progressive construction" or a construction "from below". More specifically, in the USA the word "populism" is often considered directly connected to existence of a "left political equality". On the contrary, in Europe a negative characterization of populism prevails - expressed mainly with academics, journalists, etc. belonging to the liberal camp- which they equate with demagoguery (Müller, 2016).

In the past, Lipset (1963) and Germani (1978) defined populism as a political movement while Weyland (2001), trying to interpret Latin America politics, argued that populism is a political strategy. This theory assumes the existence of a charismatic leader who tries to seize power by being accessible to his/her potential voters, maintaining a direct and unmediated relationship with them.

One of the definitions that received special recognition mainly among scholars of political theory was the one developed by Ernesto Laclau. According to Laclau (2005) populism is a form of discourse which has as "nodal point" the "people" and divides society into two opposing camps: the "people" against the "elite", the "establishment". The concept of "people" in populist discourse, however, is a construction; populist discourse does not express an already existing popular identity, but rather creates it.

Mudde (2004) defines populism as ideology. He argues that, unlike other ideologies like nationalism or socialism, populism cannot explain all social phenomena. It is a "thin-centered" ideology which divides the social field into two groups - just like Laclau's view - which conflict with each other, the "pure people"

and the “corrupt elite”. Mudde’s theory also states that “politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”.

Finally, the populism approach that has gained ground in recent decades sees populism as a set of ideas. This approach (ideational approach to populism), however, goes hand in hand with two previous approaches, that of populism as ideology and that as discourse. Specifically, scholars who support this approach consider that populism is characterized by a specific discourse-rhetoric which is common in its all forms, from political party speeches to speeches of political movements, sharing a common worldview that is a Manichean division of society into two warring groups, the “common people” against the “corrupt elite”. This set of ideas, as Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) claim, seem to have an impact on both rhetoric and political practices of populist leaders and mobilize people to support populist actors.

The ideational approach to populism differs from the others mentioned above in terms of the notion that people already have populist attitudes that are in “hypnosis” and are mobilized in cases of “moral hazard” with the help of populist actors (i.e., populist movements, populist charismatic leaders etc.) (Hawkins & Riding, 2010; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012).

The ideational approach paves the way for studying both the supply- and demand-side of populism by using survey items to measure populist attitudes.

Individual-level studies on populism

Recent scholarship uses survey items to measure levels of populism among individuals. Hawkins and Riding (2010) developed a battery of six Likert-scale survey items to measure the populist attitudes of US citizens. These items were included in the AmericasBarometer of 2008 conducted in 24 American countries. Four of these items, further refined by focusing on capturing the Manichean view of politics and the will of the people, were also included in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES) and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP) surveys (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012). Building on these initial studies, many scholars have tested the battery of the six survey items or parts of it, with most of these studies sharing the notion that populism is a set of ideas, thus it can be measured as an attitude (Rooduijn, 2018). Akkerman et al. (2014) tested a similar set of items in the Netherlands but added further items to measure the Manichean dimension of populism as well as pluralism (three items) and anti-elitism (three items). This set of the six survey items has become an important point of reference for subsequent attempts to measure populism, as it appears to cover a relatively broad range of the latent populist attitudes information (Van Hauwaert et al. 2019).

Stanley (2011) designed a set of eight Likert-scale items to measure populist attitudes in Slovakia. These were two items about the homogeneity of the people and the elite, two about the competitive nature of political life, two about the attitudes towards democracy and two about the moral dimension of politics. Five of the eight survey items were unique while three were similar to other studies (i.e., the one referring to good vs evil, the one on democracy and the one on people's trust). Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) used a set of eight Likert-scale items to measure populism in nine European countries as part of the LIVEWHAT project. Six of these items come from previous studies by Hawkins and Riding (2010) and Akkerman et al.

(2014) while two of them are unique and measure European populist attitudes. Although most of the aforementioned studies conclude that citizens may have pervasive latent populist attitudes, other studies (e.g., Elchardus & Spruyt 2016) argue that, despite the general prevalence of populist attitudes in the public, there is variation in levels of their populist attitudes.

Elite studies on populism

The individual-level studies on populist attitudes mentioned above form the foundation of the elite studies on populist attitudes. Although some of the most fundamental studies of populism focus on elites in a more conceptual and qualitative way (e.g., Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004), some recent studies take a more quantitative approach to examine levels of populism among the elites. Using survey items to measure populist attitudes at the elite level is very useful for the evaluation of the positions of elected officials and political candidates, thereby gaining insight into the within-party differentiation of populism. In this regard, recent studies measure populist attitudes through elite surveys that ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements (Andreadis & Ruth-Lovell, 2019; Stavrakakis et al., 2017; Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017). Findings from these studies show that populist parties (even when in power as in Greece after the 2015 national election) score higher in populism than mainstream parties but having many years of experience in government (as in Bolivia) may tame the anti-elite elements of the populist ideology of populist legislators.

Congruence

Congruence is conceptualized as the connection between citizens and their representatives (Önnudóttir, 2014). The concept of congruence relies on the claim that candidates and elected officials should consider the expectations, needs, and wants of the voters they represent (Powell, 2004) and that the policies implemented by the ruling political parties should closely reflect the wishes of those who voted for them (Arnold & Franklin, 2012), being an important tool to evaluate the performance of democratic representation (Karyotis et al., 2014). Scholars, in order to study candidate-voter congruence, measure the degree to which representatives' views correspond to voters' preferences and orientations (Freire et al., 2014).

Convergence between representatives and the citizens they represent it can be either at an ideological level or at a specific policy level. Scholarship focuses on attitudes and ideology, as it is too demanding to expect detailed policy preferences from voters (Lax & Phillips, 2012).

Many recent congruence studies use surveys of elected members of parliament (Belchior et al., 2016; Dolný & Baboš, 2015) or candidates (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017; Costello et al., 2012; Leimgruber et al., 2010) to measure representatives positions in the same way as voters, not assuming their positions but asking them directly.

Although many congruence studies focus on the linkage between citizens and their representatives based on the left/right dimension (e.g., Powell, 2009; Belchior, 2010; Belchior, 2013), some scholars go beyond the left/right scale and use several

policy issues to explore congruence of voters and elites. Scholars also use GAL-TAN dimension examining issues like immigration or European integration dimension (Costello et al., 2012; Hooghe et al., 2002; Karyotis et al., 2014; Mattila & Raunio, 2006; Stecker & Tausendpfund, 2016). Recently, Stavrakakis et al. (2017) examined congruence of Greek voters and elites based on their positions on populism. Drawing from this paper, we will study the convergence of the Greek voters-candidates on populism-related issues.

Data and Methodology

This paper uses data from the Greek post-election studies of 2019 held as mobile friendly web-based surveys (Andreadis, 2015a, 2015b), namely the Greek Candidate Survey, part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) and the Greek Voter Study, part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). CCS and CSES are products of international coordinated efforts to collect data about the candidates who participate at each country's national elections and the voters respectively. Both surveys are conducted via common core questionnaires that are sent to the parliamentary candidates and the voters respectively in the aftermath of the national elections. The questionnaires include a variety of questions that cover a broad spectrum of politics. Matters like relationships between the candidate, the party and the voters, democracy and representation, recruitment and carrier patterns, issues and ideology and campaigning, are located on the core of the CCS questionnaire while the CSES common core questionnaire includes questions about people's voting behaviour, views on democracy, representation, parties or party leaders, ideology and issues like immigrants, minorities, populism etc. The 2019 Greek election studies questionnaires were enriched with additional populist survey items in the context of the DataPopEU research project funded by the Hellenic Foundation for Research & Innovation (H.F.R.I.) for the better study of the populist phenomenon.

The target population of the analysis of the candidate survey are the parliamentary candidates of the five of the six parties that after the Greek national elections of July 2019 compose the Greek parliament: i) New Democracy (ND), ii) Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA), iii) Movement of Change (KINAL), iv) Greek Solution (EL), and v) MERA 25. Out of the six parties elected, we excluded the Communist Party (KKE) of our analysis because it has always and consistently refused to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates. Moreover, most of Communist Party candidates do not run personal campaigns, they do not have personal websites and it is arguably impossible to find their personal contact details.

The target population of the analysis of the voter survey are Greek citizens who were eligible to vote at the time of the Greek national elections (i.e., they were at least 17 years old -voting age in Greece since 2016) and voted for the five parties that constitute the Greek parliament after the 2019 national elections.

For this paper we don't use all survey data but only those that are related to populist attitudes. These survey items were included as five-point Likert items using the following coding 1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: neither agree nor disagree, 4: agree, 5: strongly agree and are presented in the table (Table 1) below.

Table 1. Survey items used in the 2019 post-election studies

Code	Origin	Question
Q04a	CSES module 5	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
Q04b	CSES module 5	Most politicians do not care about the people.
Q04c ¹	CSES module 5	Most politicians are trustworthy.
Q04d	CSES module 5	Politicians are the main problem in Greece.
Q04e	CSES module 5	Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.
Q04f	CSES module 5	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
Q04g	CSES module 5	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.
AMZ_POP3	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
AMZ_POP4	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
AMZ_POP5	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
AMZ_POP1	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	The politicians in Greek parliament need to follow the will of the people.
SAK-POP7	Stavrakakis et al (2017)	Popular demands are today ignored in favor of what benefits the establishment.
SAK-POP8	Stavrakakis et al (2017)	Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.
TP1	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.
TP2	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.
TP3	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.
TP4	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
TP5	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.
TP6	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.
TP7	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.

¹ Q04c is expressed in a positive way towards politicians and when it is used in the analysis conducted in this paper, it is reversed.

TP8	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The people I disagree with politically are not evil.
TP9	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.

In order to decide which items we should include in our populist attitudes index, we first apply Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003) using the R package *mokken* (van der Ark, 2012) to our datasets. Our aim is to construct a uni-dimensional scale. All items that belong to different scales or are not associated with any of the other items are left out of the scale. Afterwards, we use the mean value of the items of this uni-dimensional scale as our populist attitudes index to explore whether candidates and voters of the five Greek political parties under study score low or high on this index, i.e., have populist attitudes, and then compare voters' index to the candidates' index they vote for to see how far apart they are in terms of their views on populist issues.

Data analysis

Populist attitudes scale

We begin our analysis by exploring whether the populist attitudes items can be used to construct a uni-dimensional scale. As stated above, we run Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003) using the R package *mokken* (van der Ark, 2012) in both voter and candidate study data.

Voter study

At first, we apply Mokken scale analysis in voter study data. Most of the items seem to construct a uni-dimensional scale, however there are two pairs of items that belong to different scales and three items that are not associated with any of the other items we have used. We start with the evaluation of the four items of the former group, and we continue with the three items in the latter group.

All four items that belong to different scales come from the Team Populism battery (Castanho Silva et al., 2019): [TP1] Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people., [TP2] Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job. , [TP7] You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics., [TP8] The people I disagree with politically are not evil. One item that fails to enter the scale is another Team Populism item that is not associated with the other items we have used: [TP9] The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed. Another item that is not associated with any of the other items we have used is one of the CSES items: [Q04e] Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done. Finally, the last of the items that have failed to our MSA check for a unidimensional scale is: [SAK_POP8] Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-

making. For a detailed discussion about the failure of these items see the paper in the same ECPR panel by Stavrakakis, Andreadis and Teperoglou (2022).




Figure 1 Distribution of the populist attitudes index

All the other items, construct a unidimensional scale ($H=0.414$) and we can use the arithmetic mean of these items to create a populist attitudes index. The distribution of this index is almost symmetrical, with very low levels of Skewness (-0.19) and Kurtosis (-0.22), i.e. very similar to a Normal distribution (Figure 1). The mean value and the median is 3.6 and the standard deviation is 0.62.

Candidate study

Applying mokken scale analysis on candidate study data, most of the items seem to construct a uni-dimensional scale except for the ones mentioned in the previous section (i.e., the items excluded of the scale in voter study data e.g., TP1, TP2, TP7, TP9, Q04e and SAK_POP8) and three items that although in voter study seem to be a part of the uni-dimensional scale, in the candidate study they don't. These items are:

[AMZ-POP1] The politicians in Greek parliament need to follow the will of the people.

[AMZ_POP3] The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.

[TP3] The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.

All the other 12 items, construct a uni-dimensional scale ($H=0.452$) and we can use the arithmetic mean of these items to create a populist attitudes index. However, as the three items (AMZ-POP1, AMZ-POP3 and TP3) were marginally excluded from the scale and in order not to change the voter scale we keep these three items to have a single uni-dimensional scale, common to voter and candidate study. Table 2 shows the 15 remaining survey items that construct our scale and seem to work across both candidate and voter study.²

Table 2. Survey items used in the 2019 post-election studies

Code	Origin	Question
Q04a	CSES module 5	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
Q04b	CSES module 5	Most politicians do not care about the people.
Q04c ³	CSES module 5	Most politicians are trustworthy.
Q04d	CSES module 5	Politicians are the main problem in Greece.
Q04f	CSES module 5	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
Q04g	CSES module 5	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.
AMZ_POP3	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
AMZ_POP4	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
AMZ_POP5	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
AMZ_POP1	Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014)	The politicians in Greek parliament need to follow the will of the people.
SAK-POP7	Stavrakakis et al (2017)	Popular demands are today ignored in favor of what benefits the establishment.
TP3	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.
TP4	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.
TP5	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.
TP6	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.

² We have replicated the analysis after excluding the three items from both datasets (voters and candidates) and the results we have got were very similar to the results presented in this paper.

³ Q04c is expressed in a positive way towards politicians and when it is used in the analysis conducted in this paper, it is reversed.

Our populist attitudes index, same in both surveys, is constructed as the mean value of the fifteen populist attitudes items that form a uni-dimensional scale (Mean=3.53).

As Table 3 indicates, New Democracy (ND) (in power after the 2019 Greek national elections) and Movement for Change (KINAL), PASOK renamed, – parties generally assumed to be non-populist – score relatively low on populist attitudes index (i.e., their mean value is lower than 3.5). This is consistent with previous findings (Stavrakakis et al., 2017) using data from the Greek post-election study of 2015. However, 2015 findings differ from those of 2019 for SYRIZA. In Stavrakakis et al. (2017) findings, SYRIZA candidates scored high on the populism index while in this paper SYRIZA candidates score is lower. This can be explained as data collection took place after four years of SYRIZA in power, so it seems that its candidates may have moderated their stances on populism-related issues, and especially anti-elitism and their positions on populism seem to be almost the same with those of KINAL-PASOK. Indeed, as the Latin American experience shows, parties with long experience in government seem to moderate their populist attitudes (e.g., in Bolivia) (Andreadis & Ruth-Lovell, 2019). On the other hand, the two new entries in the Greek parliament, Greek Solution and European Realistic Disobedience Front (MeRA25) seem to score over 3.5 with Greek Solution scoring 3.87 and MeRA25 of Yanis Varoufakis (former MP and minister of Finance in the SYRIZA government from January to July 2015) scoring 3.67.

Table 3. Mean value of candidates per political party


Party	Mean
NEW DEMOCRACY (ND)	2.72
COALITION OF THE RADICAL LEFT (SYRIZA)	3.09
MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE (KINAL)	3.05
GREEK SOLUTION	3.87
EUROPEAN REALISTIC DISOBEDIENCE FRONT (MERA25)	3.67

As stated by De Cleen, Moffitt, Panayotu and Stavrakakis (2019), Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), part of which is MeRA25, can be seen as a form of transnational populism, constructing a “European people” in opposition to an international “elite”. Therefore, our findings of MeRA25 candidates having populist attitudes may not be that surprising.

Finally, an important part of this paper is to investigate the position of each party's candidates in terms of their positions on issues related to populism and the positions of their voters to see how far they are from each other. As Diagram 1 indicates, the voters of ND, SYRIZA and KINAL-PASOK score higher on populist attitudes index than the candidates they vote for. The median voter and the median candidate of ND and KINAL-PASOK seem to score below 3.5, meaning that neither

candidates of these parties nor voters have populist attitudes. It is worth noting that voters and candidates of KINAL-PASOK seem to be very close in their views on populism-related issues. The median SYRIZA voter scores higher than 3.5, meaning that they have populist attitudes in contrast to the candidates they vote for who score below this threshold. This difference can be explained, as mentioned above, by SYRIZA's four years of experience in government. Candidates of SYRIZA, after being in power, may not easily adopt anti-elite views while their voters still have anti-elitist, populist attitudes. On the other hand, both candidates and voters of the two small Greek parties (Greek Solution and MeRA25) score above the threshold. In addition, both the voters of the Greek Solution and the candidates are close in their views on populism. The same applies to the voters and candidates of MeRA25, indicating that candidates and voters of the Greek solution and Mera25 have populist attitudes. Generally, voters of all parties seem to score higher in the populist attitudes index than the candidates they vote for, but the distance observed in the two smallest parties is very small.

Diagram 1. Candidate-voter distance in the populism index



As Diagram 1 and Table 4 indicate, the empirical cumulative distribution of ND and SYRIZA voters is considerably higher than voters of these parties, suggesting that voters have significantly higher populism index values than the candidates they support. For the two smaller parties (Greek Solution and Mera25) the distance is not significant. Perhaps the voter-elite distance depends on whether the party has been in power, and if so, how long it has been since then and, importantly, how much it has renewed since the time it was in power. Candidates of parties that govern or have recently governed cannot have a negative attitude towards a group to which they belong.

Table 4. Significance of the distance between candidates and voters

Party	Significance
NEW DEMOCRACY (ND)	0
COALITION OF THE RADICAL LEFT (SYRIZA)	0
MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE (KINAL)	0.003
GREEK SOLUTION	0.258
EUROPEAN REALISTIC DISOBEDIENCE FRONT (MERA25)	0.158

Conclusion

In this paper we have used data from Greek post-elections studies of 2019, namely the Greek candidate study and the Greek voter study, enriched with additional survey items on populist attitudes in the context of the research project DATAPOPEU. We have used only the survey items related to populist attitudes to construct an index. We have demonstrated that this index can be used to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties and voters in contemporary Greece. More specifically, our findings show that the candidates of the parties that are new to the Greek parliament (Greek Solution and MeRA25) score significantly higher than the candidates of the mainstream parties that have been generally categorized as non-populist or anti-populist (i.e., ND and KINAL-PASOK). However, it is worth noting that SYRIZA, a Greek party that had been in power for four years (2015-2019) and is generally characterized as populist, scored lower than Greek Solution and MeRA25 on the populist attitudes index, scoring about the same as KINAL-PASOK, thus forming together with KINAL-PASOK and ND the non-populist group. This finding can be explained as data collection took place after four years of SYRIZA in power, therefore it seems that its candidates may have moderated their stances on populism-related issues, and especially anti-elitism.

Furthermore, we showed that half of the respondents in the voter study score quite high on populist attitude index. Comparing the positions of each party's candidates to the positions of their voters, we found that voters of all parties seem to score higher in the populist attitudes index than the candidates they vote for. Specifically, voters of ND and KINAL-PASOK scored higher than the candidates they vote for. However, they both scored below populist attitudes index, meaning that neither the candidates nor the voters are populist. A finding, worth mentioning is that SYRIZA voters appear to have populist attitudes in contrast to the candidates they vote for who do not. This difference between candidates and voters can be explained by SYRIZA's four years of experience in government. Candidates of SYRIZA, after being in power, may not easily adopt anti-elite views while their voters still have anti-elitist, populist attitudes. On the other hand, we showed that both candidates and voters of the two small Greek parties (Greek Solution and MeRA25) scored above the populist index, indicating that candidates and voters of these two parties have populist attitudes. In addition, it is worth noting that voters and candidates of KINAL-PASOK, Greek Solution and MeRA25 seem to be very close in their views on populism-related issues.

Finally, applying mokken scale analysis in both candidate and voter study data we found the survey items on populism that seem to work across both types of

surveys. This finding can save scholars time when designing their populism survey questionnaire.

Regarding further future research, these datasets could be combined with data from an expert survey to cross-validate political parties positions on populism. Additional subjects of study would include congruence between candidates and voters beyond the Greek context by studying the positions of European political parties characterized as populist and their voters on issues related to populism.

Acknowledgements



The research work was supported by the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation

(H.F.R.I.) under the “First Call for H.F.R.I. Research Projects to support Faculty members and Researchers and the procurement of high-cost research equipment grant” (Project Number: 3572).

References

- Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). *How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters*. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(9), (pp. 1324–1353). DOI: 10.1177/0010414013512600
- Andreadis, I. (2015a). Comparison of Response Times between Desktop and Smartphone Users. In D. Toninelli, R. Pinter, & P. de Pedraza (Eds.), *Mobile Research Methods: Opportunities and challenges of mobile research methodologies* (pp. 63–79). Ubiquity Press. <https://doi.org/10.5334/bar.e>
- Andreadis, I. (2015b). Web surveys optimized for smartphones: Are there differences between computer and smartphone users? *Methods, Data, Analysis*, 9(2), 213–228. <https://doi.org/10.12758/mda.2015.012>
- Andreadis, I. & Ruth-Lovell, S. P. (2019). Elite surveys. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis* (pp. 112-127). New York: Routledge.
- Andreadis, I., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). *European Populist Parties in Government: How Well are Voters Represented? Evidence from Greece*. *Swiss Political Science Review* DOI: 10.1111/spsr.12255
- Andreadis, I., Stavrakakis, Y., & Demertzis, N. (2018). *Populism, Ethnic Nationalism and Xenophobia*. *Science and Society, Review of Political and Moral Theory*, 37(0), 11–40. <https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.14712>

- Arnold, C., & Franklin, M. N. (2012). Introduction: Issue Congruence and Political Responsiveness. *West European Politics*, 35(6), (pp. 1217–1225). <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.713741>
- Belchior, A. M. (2010). *Ideological Congruence among European Political Parties*. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 16 (1), (pp. 121-142).
- Belchior, A. M. (2013). *Explaining left–right party congruence across European party systems: A test of micro-, meso- and macro-level models*. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(3), (pp. 352–386).
- Belchior, A. M., Tsatsanis, E., & Teixeira, C. P. (2016). *Representation in times of crisis: deputy–voter congruence on views of representation in Portugal*. *International Political Science Review*, 37(2), (pp. 277–293). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512114562295>
- Betz, H.-G. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. Macmillan.
- Canovan, M. (1999). *Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy*. *Political Studies*, 47(1), (pp. 2–16).
- Castanho Silva, B., Andreadis, I., Anduiza, E., Blanuša, N., Corti, Y. M., Delfino, G., Rico, G., Ruth, S. P., Spruyt, B., Steenbergen, M., & Littvay, L. (2019). Public Opinion Surveys: A New Scale. In K. Hawkins, R. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis* (pp. 128–149). Democracy and Extremism Series, Routledge. <http://www.polres.gr/en/sites/default/files/TIAP-Chapter7.pdf>
- Costello, R., Thomassen, J., & Rosema, M. (2012). *European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties*. *West European Politics*, 35(6), (pp. 1226–1248). <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.713744>
- De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2019). *The potentials and difficulties of transnational populism: The case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25)*, *Political Studies*, 68, (pp. 146-166). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022210919847576>
- Dolný, B., & Baboš, P. (2015). *Voter–Representative Congruence in Europe: A Loss of Institutional Influence?* *West European Politics*, 38(6), (pp. 1274–1304). <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1053180>
- Donovan, T. (2021). *Right populist parties and support for strong leaders*. *Party Politics*, 27(5), (pp. 858–869). <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820920853>
- Elchardus, M., & Spruyt, B. (2016). *Populism, Persistent Republicanism and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology*. *Government and Opposition* 51(01), (pp. 111–133).
- Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I., & Leite Viegas, J. M. (2014). *Political Representation in Bailed-out Southern Europe: Greece and Portugal Compared*. *South European Society and Politics*, 19(4), (pp. 413–433). <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.984381>

- Germani, G. (1978). *Authoritarianism, fascism, and national populism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Greaves, L., & Vowles, J. (2020). Measuring Populism in New Zealand. In J. Vowles & J. Curtin (Eds.), *A Populist Exception?* ANU Press. <http://doi.org/10.22459/PE.2020.03>
- Hawkins, K. A., & Riding, S. (2010). *Populist attitudes and their correlates among citizens: Survey evidence from the Americas*. ECPR Workshop ‘Disassembling Populism (and Putting It Back Together Again): Collaborative Empirical Research on Interactions among Populism’s Attributes’. Muenster, Germany.
- Hawkins, K. A., Riding, S., & Mudde, C. (2012). *Measuring populist attitudes*. (IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series No. 55).
- Hawkins, K. A., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2019). Introduction: the ideational approach. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Ed.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis* (pp. 1–24). New York: Routledge.
- Hawkins, K. A., Rovira Kaltwasser, C., & Andreadis, I. (2020). The Activation of Populist Attitudes. *Government and Opposition*, 55(2). <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.23>
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002). *Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?* *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(8), (pp. 965– 989). <https://doi.org/10.1177/001041402236310>
- Karyotis, G., Rüdiger, W., & Judge, D. (2014). *Representation and Austerity Politics: Attitudes of Greek Voters and Elites Compared*. *South European Society and Politics*, 19(4), (pp. 435–456). <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.977478>
- Laclau, E. (2005). Populism: What’s in a Name? In F. Panizza (Ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (pp. 32–49). London: Verso.
- Lipset, S. M. (1963). *The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis*. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28 (pp. 515-531)
- Lax, J. R., & Phillips, J. H. (2012). *The Democratic Deficit in the States*. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1), (pp. 148–166). <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00537.x>
- Leimgruber, P., Hangartner, D., & Leemann, L. (2010). *Comparing Candidates and Citizens in the Ideological Space*. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 16(3), (pp. 499– 531). <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00439.x>
- Mattila, M., & Raunio, T. (2006). *Cautious Voters – Supportive Parties: Opinion Congruence between Voters and Parties on the EU-Dimension*. *European Union Politics*, 7 (4), (pp. 427–449).
- Mudde, C. (2004). *The populist zeitgeist*. *Government and Opposition*, 39(3), (pp. 541– 563).
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

- Müller, J. W. (2016). *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Önnudóttir, E. H. (2014). *Policy Congruence and Style of Representation: Party Voters and Political Parties*. *West European Politics*, 37(3), (pp. 538–563). <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.841057>
- Powell, G. B. (2004). *Political Representation in Comparative Politics*. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7(1), (pp. 273–296). <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815>
- Powell, G. B. (2009). *The Ideological Congruence Controversy*. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(12), (pp. 1475–1497). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332147>
- Rooduijn, M. (2018). *What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties*. *European Political Science Review* 10(3): 351–368.
- Stanley, B. 2011. *Populism, nationalism, or national populism? An analysis of Slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election*. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44(4), (pp. 257–270).
- Stavrakakis, Y., Andreadis, I., & Katsambekis, G. (2017). *A new populism index at work: identifying populist candidates and parties in the contemporary Greek context*. *European Politics and Society*, 18(4), (pp. 446-464), DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2016.1261434
- Stecker, C., & M. Tausendpfund (2016). *Multidimensional Government-Citizen Congruence and Satisfaction with Democracy*. *European Journal of Political Research* 55(3), (pp. 492–511).
- van der Ark, L. A. (2012). *New Developments in Mokken Scale Analysis in R*. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 48, 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v048.i05>
- Van Hauwaert, S., & van Kessel, S. (2018). *Beyond Protest and Discontent: A CrossNational Analysis of the Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party Support*. *European Journal of Political Research* 57 (1), (pp. 68–92).
- Van Hauwaert, S., Schimpf, C. H., & Azevedo, F. (2018). Public opinion surveys: evaluating existing measures. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis* (pp. 128-149). New York: Routledge.
- van Schuur, W. H. (2003). *Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and Parametric Item Response Theory*. *Political Analysis*, 11(02), 139–163. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpg002>

- Weyland, K. (2001). *Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics*. *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 1. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422412>
- Wuttke, A., Schimpf, C., & Schoen, H. (2020). *When the Whole Is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Populist Attitudes and Other Multidimensional Constructs*. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 356–374. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000807>